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Two recent books on the development and deployment of large projects have recently 
been released.  Both books tackle Megaprojects, but from somewhat different points-
of-view, one European, the other American; one disparaging, the other positive; one 
largely statistical-empirical, the other political-historical.  We consider these books in 
turn. 
In Megaprojects and Risk, Flyvbjerg et al. examined the problems with the 
conventional megaproject development process from the perspective of risk 
management.  Based on in-depth reviews of three large-scale European megaprojects, 
namely the Channel Tunnel, the Great Belt Link, and the Oresund Link, the book is 
structured into two major portions: identifying problem and proposing solutions to the 
problem of interest.  
To begin, the book identifies a common feature of the conventional 
megaprojects development, that is, despite the overwhelming costs overrun, below-
projection revenue, and strikingly poor performance records in terms of economy, 
environment and public support, megaprojects grow continuously in number and scale 
around the world, forming the so-called megaprojects paradox.  Understanding of this 
problem and its consequences are explored in the first six chapters, which document 
the costs overrun, demand overforecasts, and viability inflation of major megaprojects.   
The book then proceeds to use risk as an analytic frame and identify the main 
causes of the megaprojects paradox to be inadequate treatment of risk, and more 
fundamentally, the lack of accountability toward risk. In particular, it is argued that 
megaprojects normally involved great magnitudes of uncertainties, making risks 
unavoidable, and decision makers and the public would be deceived about the project 
outcomes in absence of proper risk analysis. Hence, the book proposes 
acknowledging and managing project risks as a solution to the megaproject paradox.    
The book attributes the problem of optimistic appraisal to the failure of the 
decision making process to acknowledge and manage risk, that is, decisions are made 
based on decision makers and the general public’s misinformed visions about the 
outcomes of projects. However, one can explore further the causes of this problem 
since even if risks information were brought to the decision makers, optimal appraisal 
would not necessarily be reduced as long as incentives to produce optimistic estimate 
of viability are stronger than the disincentives. In fact, sensitivity analysis is normally 
included in feasibility studies, indicating the availability of information about 
associated risk. Ignorance of risk information in optimistic appraised projects could 
then be attributed to lack of incentives to treat the risk.   
Risk management is not sufficient in order to fundamentally address the 
megaproject paradox.  The concept of risk provides an instrument to analyze the 
problem. And lack of accountability to manage risk is identified as the key problem 
that leads to the megaproject paradox. However, the problem of risk management is a 
representation of an underlying cause: the institutional arrangement of the decision 
making process, that is, those who make decisions need not necessarily to be 
responsible for the risk of decisions made. Fundamentally addressing the megaproject 
paradox hence lies in better institutional arrangements such that decision makers are 
also in the position of taking the risks of decisions made, which would create 
incentives to produce responsible decision making.  
Transparency is one instrument of accountability proposed in this book to be 
employed in project development. An assumption of this approach is to take the role 
of government as one that represents and protects the public interest, and hence 
transparency requires the possibility for the public to verify this assumption at all 
times. While in principal this assumption is true, in practice government’s functions 
deviate greatly from it, especially in the megaproject development process when the 
initiatives of projects are often a bottom-up process representing localized interests 
that are narrower than public interests. As a consequence, difficulties might arise 
when implementing the transparency strategy in terms of verifying government’s role 
of protecting the public interests.  
The idea of allocating risks to those best suited to manage them also serves an 
equity function, in the sense that it reverses the common practices of transferring costs 
of risks to the ordinary citizens, who are in the weakest positions to protect 
themselves.  
One feature of the book is that it documents in detail the megaproject paradox 
based on information about hundreds of projects in twenty nations and cross five 
continents, which makes a rich resource for those who are interested in this topic and 
issue. The inherent connections between the identified problems and the proposed 
solutions, however, are not as strong and obvious in this book.  
Under the similar title of Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban 
Public Investment, Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff examine the megaproject 
phenomenon from the perspective of public investment politics.  Concentrating its 
coverage on three project types of highway, airport, and rail transit systems, the book 
studies cases of American large public works projects following the presentation of 
the history of American public investments and the leading theories of urban politics.  
In particular, the book starts with narratives and empirical research of large 
public megaprojects through the history of urban public investment over the past 
century. This is followed by a review of leading theories of urban and American 
politics, examining how well theories can explain the facts observed through history. 
Common themes are drawn from the projects narratives and then most relevant 
theories are integrated with projects under study to pursue better understanding of the 
megaproject politics. Based on the review of previous megaproject developments, the 
book concludes with speculations on the future of urban mega-projects.  
One feature of the book is the broad perspective it provides on the topic of 
megaprojects development in terms of the time span and theoretical scope. The 
history provides readers with a unique view of the patterns and trends of megaprojects 
developments at a macro level, integrating that with major policy shifts over time, 
insights could be drawn about the fundamental forces that drove the trend of project 
developments.  Meanwhile, the wide spectrum of theories provides arrays of 
perspectives of how decisions are made and public choices are shaped.  
Waves of megaprojects developments over the past half-century reflect the 
back and fourth interplay between the demand for megaprojects and the opposition to 
such projects from those that tended to be negatively affected. Throughout history and 
across different types of projects, it seems always true that the systems function in a 
way that some would benefit from a project while others have to pay for the costs. 
Hence the problem of balancing conflicting values would persist for megaproject 
development and “has no solution” as put by Altshuler and Luberroff. A realistic and 
meaningful approach to dealing with this situation would be to improve the process 
design so as to seek the wisest balance among multiple perspectives.  
Another interesting point brought up about the federal-local relationship in 
project development is the notion of “bottom-up Federalism” in chapter seven. 
Particularly, the book argues against the existence of national goals by federal 
government when granting funding assistances to local projects. Instead, the federal 
decision process is described as one dominated by local initiative and pork barrel 
bargaining. This explains why recent megaprojects normally fail any reasonable 
benefit-cost analysis and why the benefits-cost analyses of a project development 
process is, more often than not, at best of minor importance, at worst irrelevant.  
 These two books tackle one subject, and both are worthwhile contributions to 
the literature.  Altshuler and Luberoff, based in Boston, seem encouraged by the Big 
Dig (dismissing the cost overruns as a political problem of curiosity as to how it is 
resolved, rather than a social problem that has significant opportunity costs), which 
those of us in the rest of the country paying for it may not see as quite as worthwhile.  
The Big Dig is impressive: both as a piece of engineering and a work of politics, but 
there is always the risk biographers have of falling in love with their subject.  In 
contrast, Flyvbjerg et al. seem to face the opposite problem, condemning the projects 
they analyze, denying the benefits that may not appear on the benefit-cost ledger.  
While tending to lean in favor of B/C analysis, it is clear that some improvements 
open up new pathways for technologies whose benefits cannot properly be assessed at 
the present time.   
 If one thinks of the project (Big Dig or Channel Tunnel) not simply as a 
project, but as research and development for the future, developing new technologies 
for things like tunneling, having an apparent Benefit/Cost ratio below 1.0 might be 
justified.  As noted by Altshuler and Luberoff, we have a mature transportation  
system.  The projects described (new transit, new airports, new highways) are largely 
replacements, not new developments. It remains to be seen whether the technologies 
pioneered as part of megaprojects will open up new opportunities and enable the 
deployment of new networks. 
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